


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Understanding Non-Compliance Behavior w.r.t. Pinger Regulations in the Northeast Gillnet Fishery

SSB Compliance Project

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Date

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Background

- NMFS primarily uses gear modification and area closures to protect marine mammals and sea turtles.
- Our objective is to identify the factors that may influence a vessel's compliance decision.
- What can we learn from the gillnet fishery?
- Can we then apply our lessons to improve compliance in other fisheries to protect marine mammals and turtles?



Compliance Study – 3 Phases

- Phase 1 - Compliance Model (2007-2010) under 1998 TRT Plan
- Phase 2 – Focus Group Ground-truthing & survey development
- Phase 3 – Compliance Model under the current harbor porpoise management plan (2010-2012)

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Phase 1
U.S. Protected Species Regulations:
Understanding Non-compliance
in the Northeast Gillnet Fishery

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Economics Compliance Work

- According to Becker (1968) violations are more likely when:
 - fines are lower
 - rate/likelihood of detection is lower
- BUT, Kuperan and Sutinen (1995, Sutinen and Kuperan 1999) in fisheries studies found:
 - a majority of fishermen seemed to comply even when the expected gain from violating exceeded the penalty.



Adding in Anthropology, Sociology

- An individual might be motivated to comply because of normative influences.
- That is, there may be moral, ethical, legitimacy, or social influences present that induce an individual to comply even when the economic incentives for non-compliance are high (Weber et al. 2004, Ostrom et al. 2012 and others).
- Economic and normative factors are used in our empirical model to potentially explain an individual's compliance decision within a probit framework.



Data

- **Current Fishing Year: April 2009 – May 2010.**
We use April 2007 – May 2009 to calculate a vessel's history

2009-2010	North of 40⁰	1998 Pinger Mgt. Areas (PMAs)	Observed in PMAs
Revenues	\$45.6 M	\$8.3 M (18%)	
Vessels	248	107 (43%)	59 (55%)

- Violation occurs when a vessel does not have the correct number of pingers attached to the gillnet. (Matches Palka and Orphanides 2008)



Model Variables

- Perceived Detection
- Gross Tons
- Ratio horsepower to vessel length
- Years of experience gillnetting
- Gross revenues previous year
- Gillnet Gear Exclusively
- Previous violations
- Port Behavior (port of landing)
- Sectors
- TRT member in their port (port of landing)



RESULTS

Characteristics of Individuals Most Likely to Violate

- Low level of detection
- Violated in previous years
- Use multiple gears
- Lower horsepower per foot
- Higher gross tons
- Associated with a sector

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Phase 2 Ground-truthing compliance model results

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Goals and Logistics

- Investigate (March 2012)
 - Economic Factors
 - Normative Factors (Legitimacy, Ethical, Social & Moral)
- Held 4 Focus Groups (Rhode Island to Maine)
- 15 Participants (Contact list provided by Bisack)
- Meeting Structure
 - 2 hour meeting, later transcribed for analysis
 - 10 minute written introductory survey



Survey Results

Legitimacy of the problem, agency and process

- Do not believe harbor porpoise population needs protection (11/15 participants)
- Do believe the federal government has a duty to protect marine mammals (14/15 p).
- Do not believe restricting fishing is a necessary tool to protect marine mammals (9/15 p)
- Do not know who their TRT representative is (9/15 p)
- Never in touch with their TRT rep. (13/15 p)



Survey Results Legitimacy of pinger solution

- Pinger regulations are fair (10/15 participants)
- Sound made by pingers repels porpoise (11/15 p)
- Using pingers to reduce harbor porpoise catch in gillnets is effective (10/15 p)



Survey Results: Moral/Ethical

- Regulations should not be followed if they are not effective (10/15 participants)
- Regulations should be followed even if they are not fair (10/15 p)
- Attitudes of my peers about violations is:
 - It is wrong (2/15)
 - Not wrong (6/15)
 - Don't know (7/15)



Survey Results: Social Influences

- Belong to some group (13/15 participants)
- Belonging to a group does not influence their decision (12/15 p)
- Individuals I know comply with fishery regulations
 - Always (5/15 p)
 - 75% or more of the time (5/15 p)
 - 0-75% of the time (5/15 p)
- Individuals I know comply with MMPA regulations
 - Same as fishery regulations



Survey Results Economic Considerations

- Do not know whether pingers lower their profits (10/15 participants)
- Do not know the size of fines for an MMPA violation (13/15 p)
- No clear trend in answers concerning their perception of frequency of pinger violations being detected



RESULTS

Group Interviews

1. Over sampling by observers influences compliance decisions
2. They are aware of and know the “Repeat Violators”
3. Perceive that punishments are non-existent for “Repeat Violators”
4. Sector members disagreed with model result that they are more likely to violate
5. They do not discuss pinger regulations in a group/sector setting as they do general fisheries regulations



Group Interviews: Some Topics to Investigate

- Pinger compliance among sector members not transparent
- Do we need to examine by individual sector?
- Fishermen all know a subset of individuals that comply but don't know how common compliance is overall
- TRT – venue, membership, frequency was also raised as an issue. How does the TRT process compare to the fishery management council process?
- Do we need to use homeport instead of port of landing for port-based normative variables?

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Phase 3
Updates to the Compliance
Model
(2010-2011)

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Phase 3: Compliance Model Under 2007 TRT Plan

1. Data

- **Current Fishing Year: April 2010 – May 2011**
 - **Use April 2008 – May 2010 to calculate a vessel's history**
- **No. of Vessels = 97 observed in current year**

2. Results – Individuals likely to violate

- 1. Perceived Detection**
- 2. Multiple gear use**

3. Issue – Not enough history for the full model – Need 2011-2012 data



What did we learn?

- Management within and across sectors varies
- Members of a sector are not certain about compliance of peers
- Self-policing works best in small groups of similar people
- Level of observer sampling can influence compliance behavior
- Individual compliance feedback from the observer program to operators/owners is sometimes missing
- Targeting and prosecuting individuals who violate repeatedly can foster a sense of fairness and legitimacy in relation to the regulations



Next Steps

Additional focus groups in the spring – HP and sea turtle

Finish up the second model run with updated data

Analyze all the focus group data

Discuss possible changes to model variables

Consider a broader protected species compliance survey

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Sample Representativeness between all vessels fishing in pinger mgt areas and vessels in compliance sample

	All	Sample
No. Vessels	137	59
Avg. Revenue	\$280K (158%)	\$231K (54%)
Length	40.3' (16%)	40.0 (12%)
Len/VHP	8.2 (68%)	7.7 (31%)
Gillnet Gear Exclusively	60% of vessels	



Captain Consistency for sample of 59 vessels (2007-2010)

% of VTR Trips	Number of Vessels	% of Vessels
100	20	34
95	11	53
90	7	64
80	7	76
70	4	83
60	4	89
50	3	95
40	3	100%